The Buddhist Refutation of Testimony

The nature and number of pramāṇa (means of knowledge) have been the center of debate among the Indian epistemologists. Different systems of Indian philosophy accept a varying number of pramāṇas from perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), verbal testimony (śabda pramāṇa), presumption (arthāpatti), non-cognition (anupalabdhi), etc. Every system seeks to justify the number of sources of knowledge accepted by it. The discourse on this issue also extends to refute any additional source of knowledge accepted by other systems. For instance, the materialist Cārvāka accepts the only perception as the reliable source of knowledge and argues for the rejection of inference, testimony, etc. Similarly, Buddhism accepts only two reliable means, namely, Perception and Inference. It rebuts testimony as a distinct source of knowledge for the reason that linguistic expressions can not touch the fleeting reality. Language somehow enables us to pick out the object in reality through the process of exclusion. The Buddhists thus move to reduce testimonial knowledge (śabda-jñāna) into inferential knowledge (anumiti). In this paper, an attempt is made to discuss the Buddhist arguments against the testimonial knowledge to see the rationality behind their rejection. It is moreover, argued that the pragmatic role of the Buddha’s teachings does not elevate them to the level of testimony. The entire paper uses the analytical method of research. The first section of the paper discusses the śabda and its reliability in Indian orthodox philosophical systems. The second section argues on the reducibility of testimony into inference by the Buddhist epistemologists (particularly Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti). The third section focuses on the reliability of the Buddha-vaccana and his religious authority is testimonial or not?