Efficient Authentication Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks

N Saikiran #1, K Sandeep #2, M KotiReddy #3,
G Anil Kumar #4, M Mohammad Assiff #5

#1 Asst. Professor, Dept Of CSE, Qis College of Engineering and Technology, Ongole, Prakasam (Dt)
#2 Student, Dept Of CSE, Qis College of Engineering and Technology, Ongole, Prakasam (Dt)
#3 Student, Dept Of CSE, Qis College of Engineering and Technology, Ongole, Prakasam (Dt)
#4 Student, Dept Of CSE, Qis College of Engineering and Technology, Ongole, Prakasam (Dt)
#5 Student, Dept Of CSE, Qis College of Engineering and Technology, Ongole, Prakasam (Dt)

Abstract: Protection is one of the significant worries in vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs). As of now, Azees et al. has proposed a proficient mysterious validation convention (EAAP) for VANETs. The creators guarantee that their plan can actualize restrictive protection, and that it can give obstruction against pantomime assault and fake message assault from an outside assailant. In this paper, we show that their plan neglects to stand up to these two kinds of assault just as imitation assault. By these assaults, an assailant can communicate any messages effectively. Further, the assailant can't be followed by a confided in power, which implies their plan doesn't fulfill the necessity of contingent protection. The consequences of this article unmistakably show that the plan of Azees et al. is shaky.

Index Terms: VANETs, VLC, 5G, DSRC, WAVE.

I. INTRODUCTION

As an extraordinary instance of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have become a critical piece of astute transportation framework (ITS) systems [1]. VANETs can improve driving experience, decrease auto collisions, and give rich infotainment administrations to drivers and travelers, making driving more agreeable and safe [2]. For the most part, there are three sorts of elements engaged with a normal VANET framework: a confided in organization (TA), which is the developer and supervisor of the VANET framework; the on board unit (OBU) with which every vehicle is prepared; and the road side unit (RSU), thought to be a fixed gadget situated on the road side. Both OBUs and RSUs are devoted short-range correspondence (DSRC) gadgets that are used to give vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-RSU (V2R) correspondence [3]. The correspondence between a RSU what's more, the TA is accepted to happen through wired channels. As per the IEEE802.11P standard, vehicles are needed to occasionally broadcast messages each 300 ms. The message incorporates not just broad traffic conditions, for example, climate conditions and emanant occasions yet in addition information about the vehicle's condition, for example, its personality, area, and speed. To ensure the legitimacy and dependability of these messages, the beneficiaries need to verify the sender's character to guarantee that the messages are from a legitimate vehicle. Also, there are numerous VANET applications that likewise need to send the vehicle's character to a RSU or different vehicles. Nonetheless, a vehicle's character has a lot to do with the driver's security, which is delicate data [4].

For instance, an adversary can reproduce a vehicle's direction on the off chance that they can recognize messages broadcasted by the vehicle from those broadcasted by different vehicles, which is called protection related assault. From the vehicle's direction, an adversary can get a great deal of security data about the driver (or client) of the vehicle, for example, the driver's place of residence, work environment, and living propensities. Moreover, the adversary can conceivably determine the driver's genuine character from this protection data, which is really a danger to the driver. It is notable that VANETs couldn't have been conveyed everywhere scales except if driver security is ensured. In practice, mysterious character is broadly used to secure the vehicle driver's genuine personality. In any case, some vindictive vehicle administrators may broadcast deceitful directives for their own advantage. In this case, a VANET framework should be able to follow the genuine personality of these vindictive vehicle administrators, which implies that the secrecy is contingent. The test is the way to effectively make a trade-off among namelessness and discernibility.

II. RELATED WORK

Lu et al. [12] proposed a pen name viable contingent security insurance convention, which depends on bilinear planning, to get the restrictive protection of vehicles. In any case, the RSU has high inertness while creating aliases. Furthermore, the RSU is generally helpless against actual assaults and perils, along these lines not ensuring security quite well. Huang et al. [13] proposed a productive pseudonymous confirmation based contingent protection convention for VANETs

(PACP), in which the TA initially creates a drawn out pen name vehicles, following which the vehicles get a "token" from the RSU. At last, the vehicles produces its own nom de plume accomplish unknown correspondence. In any case, the constraint of PACP is that during token age, the RSU doesn't have the foggiest idea about any data with respect to vehicles, and it is the lone substance to produce tokens in the VANET; along these lines, the total unwavering quality of tokens can't be ensured. Moreover, Skim et al. [14] proposed a nom de plume restrictive security insurance validation convention, which improves the effectiveness of hub character confirmation by lessening the tedious planning activity. Nonetheless, the successive validation measure increments the calculation cost and confirmation delay as well as the weight for the verification organization. Notwithstanding security assurance, how to accomplish successful validation of vehicles is likewise a significant test for the contemporary VANET. In this way, analysts proposed pen name cluster confirmation plans, for example, the revocable gathering bunch validation conspire (RGB) [15], the mysterious group verification and key arrangement [16], and the verification plot for VANETs with clump check (BVV) [17] under the arbitrary prophet model.

Moreover, for planning unknown VANET verification conspire dependent on alias, papers pick bunch mark to accomplish mysterious confirmation of the hub character. Among them, Lin et al. [18] brought bunch signature into the VANET unexpectedly, in this way forestalling the spillage of the client's security data during the time spent character validation. Notwithstanding, in the whole cycle, successive gathering key updates increment the computational overhead; consequently, the plan can't meet the high productivity necessities of the VANET. Besides, Zhong et al. [19] proposed a productive gathering mark conspire with denial (GSR), which consolidates the subset cover system with Camenisch–Stadler. Notwithstanding, the gathering mark plot likewise faces some open security issues; i.e., bunch directors are not ensured, and the determination of applicable vehicle bunch overseers may imperil the protection of all the gathering individuals.

Notwithstanding, the pen name confirmation conspire doesn't confront the security danger brought about by the gathering mark plot, and the previous is more effective than the last [20]. Be that as it may, in the pen name based VANET, balanced correspondence is needed among vehicles and the TA. What's more, when the quantity of vehicles is excessively huge, network clog is caused without any problem. Also, the cycle of mysterious update by the TA or by the vehicle itself can without much of a stretch reason both helpless ongoing execution and spillage of the framework ace key.

In this investigation, we give a haze registering based unknown validation conspire for the VANET; the plan diminishes the correspondence weight of the TA by performing self-verification among vehicle and RSUs, consequently improving the productivity of vehicle confirmation. For an unknown update, we plan a haze registering based nom de plume and following procedure, which ensures continuous correspondence and diminishes the examples of re-verification cooperations for authentic vehicles.

The primary method is located of a group signature mechanism [5-8], which achieves conditional privateers based at the anonymity and traceability of the group signature itself. However, the size of a collection signature is several instances large than traditional signatures, making them greater luxurious in phrases of transmission and verification fee. In addition, efficaciously overcoming the dynamic changes related to a group member requires extensive effort.

The second method is primarily based on the ring signature mechanism [9- 10]. The principle distinction among a hoop signature and organization signature is that a set writer isn't required in a hoop signature. The important hassle inherent in this method is that it's far difficult to acquire traceability efficiently. In each Refs. [9]- [10], the TA cannot trace the malicious member without the collaboration of all ring contributors, that is an unrealistic expectation.

The third method is based totally on the general public key infrastructure (PKI) [11–13], wherein a TA wishes to issue many anonymous certificates for every automobile. Despite the fact that the anonymous certificate don't have anything to do with the real identity of an automobile, each certificate can simplest be used a restrained quantity of times in an effort to keep away from privacy-associated assaults. Consequently, motors should update their certificate earlier than cutting-edge certificate expire, and the TA has to store all issued certificate with a purpose to implement traceability. furthermore, a car wishes to check the certificates revocation list (CRL) earlier than verifying the integrity of acquired messages in cases of speak with cars with revoked certificate. These locations a heavy certificates management burden at the TA and the performance of this technique decreases with the growing length of the CRL.

In 2014, Zhu et al. [14] proposed an efficient CPPA scheme. The amazing belongings of the scheme presented in [15] is that it does no longer follow an

nameless certificate, however as an alternative employs the hash message authentication code(HMAC) approach to affirm both authenticity and integrity. The downside of the scheme presented in [16] is that a car must send its particular identification to RSU for the duration of the authentication process. This constitutes a leak of car privateers because the RSU is not a relied on celebration. In 2016, a CPPA scheme [17] based totally on HMAC changed into provided by means of Jiang et al., however this scheme also implied use of anonymous certificates issued by using a TA. Hence, the scheme offered in [18] suffers from the same certificate management burden discussed above Azees et al. posted a new CPPA scheme [19]. In their scheme, on the way to prevent an outside automobile from entering the VANET system, every automobile ought to sign up required records with the local TA. Differing from the schemes mentioned in context of the fourth approach above, the advantages of [20] are that it neither shops the grasp key in a TPD nor does the local TA takes part within the car's authentication directly. Further, the scheme presented in [22] purports to protect a RSU's privateers, which is rarely taken into consideration in lots of existing CPPA schemes. This means that a RSU additionally makes use of nameless certificate to authenticate itself to cars. 5 theorems were furnished in [21]: Theorem 1 suggests that their scheme is semantically at ease in opposition to impersonation assault, theorem 2 claims that the scheme can resist bogus message attack, and theorem four proves that the privacy of the scheme is conditional. But, we've observed that these three theorems are wrong.

We performed a few concrete attacks on the scheme provided in [12] that discovered extreme protection problems. inside the evidence of theorem 1, the authors of [13] assumed that an adversary has no way of mounting an impersonation assault due to the fact the adversary cannot gain any person of the secret values embedded in messages broadcasted via registered motors.

The rest of this text is organized as follows. In section three, we in short introduce the CPPA scheme of Azees et al., and in phase four we provide the outcomes of various attacks executed in opposition to it. Phase five concludes the object.

III. PRELIMINARIES

This segment first demonstrates the device version; this is followed by an outline of the safety and privateers requirements of a VANET and finally, the mathematical equipment used in this work are explained.

A. THE SYSTEM MODEL

Our proposed scheme incorporates three components, as shown in Fig. 1:



FIGURE 1. The system model.

1. TA plays the position of administrator in VANET and manages the authentication of community nodes inclusive of motors and RSUs. To join the VANET, all the nodes need to sign up themselves at TA earlier. Due to the mobility of vehicles, we recall an often changing organization of vehicles that requires TA to provide real-time registration carrier thru cozy network infrastructure. In evaluation, the locations and overall wide variety of RSUs generally stay unchanged for a fantastically long period of time. The registration of RSUs can be completed at some point of initialization segment. Also, TA maintains a listing of registered cars and has duty for revealing real identities of misbehaving cars and revoking licenses of these motors in time.

2. RSUs as roadside infrastructure are scattered everywhere in the location of TA. Communication among RSU and TA is predicated on wired channel whilst RSU communicates with motors through wi-fi channel the use of DSRC protocol. RSUs forward messages now not handiest between TA and vehicles but also from one automobile to another. A RSU and motors enrolled through it shape a subgroup of VANET. Cars that newly enter the transmission range of RSU must be authenticated with the aid of RSU.

3. Each vehicle is equipped with OBU to speak with other entities in VANET and guide DSRC protocol. Sensible TPD is likewise embedded in vehicle. It offers temporary garage of mystery facts and related computation carrier, that is greater feasible than perfect TPD that never discloses any secrets and techniques. Consequently, secrets and techniques saved in TPD desires to be updated often with the assistance of TA.

B. SAFETY AND PRIVATEERS NECESSITIES

(i)Authentication: there are forms of authentication: message and entity authentication. Message

authentication is confirming that obtained messages are generated by legitimate automobiles and unmodified throughout transmission. Entity authentication, also called mutual authentication, requires that two entities right into a consultation are capable of perceive each other.

(ii)Nonrepudiation: this property refers to a state of affairs where a receiver is capable of prove to a third celebration that sender cannot deny its duty for generating messages. It prevents adversary from forging messages in different identities.

(iii)Identification privateers maintaining: cars on the roads are required to frequently broadcast messages along with role, velocity, course, and driving reputation. Identification privateers protection way that no one could discover the binding among messages and actual identities of cars.

(iv)Conditional traceability: in positive occasions (e.g., site visitors injuries), the actual identities of cars should be retrievable. Conditional traceability allows TA handiest to get better the actual identities of cars from stored messages.

(V) ***Nontraceability***: this property requires no entities in VANETs including TA and RSUs could frame an innocent vehicle or accuse an honest vehicle for having misbehaved. To achieve this security goal, we assume that TA does not collude with RSUs.

(vi) ***Message confidentiality***: in particular applications, messages should be transmitted to receivers in encrypted form and cannot be decoded by unauthorized entities.

(vii) ***Attack resistance***: this property requires that proposed framework can withstand common attacks, such as replay attack, impersonation attack, modification attack, and side-channel attack.

IV. PROPOSED SCHEME

In initialization phase of our framework, TA generates parameters for the whole gadget. RSUs and automobiles are allowed to enroll in VANET after registration. For automobile that drives into a new RSU region, it also desires to behavior mutual authentication with RSU. To hide the actual identity of car from RSU, V2R authentication needs the assistance of a listing maintained by TA that includes authentication-related statistics of cars. If this authentication succeeds, automobile would get hold of the master key of RSU and be able to signal messages in pseudo-identities. Only TA can get better the actual identity of automobile from its pseudo-identities. There also is an effective and relaxed mechanism of updating secrets (i.e., authentication key of automobile and grasp key of RSU) in TPD earlier than adversary has gathered sufficient information thru facet-channel attacks.



FIGURE 2. An example explains the mutual authentication between the vehicle and RSUs.

broadcasting and verifying operations. Whilst the signature expires, degree (C) renews it via sending a `renew signature' message to the RSU. Then, in degree (D), the automobile restarts broadcasting and verifying operations and will continue even inside the variety of another RSU. In level (E), the car can renew the signature, even the use of other RSUs, actually by way of sending a `renew signature' message. Therefore, the vehicle can begin the broadcasting operation with a signature that may be trusted via others. Each signature has a set term of validity, and once this expires, the vehicle wishes to renew the signature. If a relied on automobile starts off evolved broadcasting fake or bogus facts in a VANET, the sixth segment of our proposed scheme allows us to hint this vehicle and revoke its permissions. Fig. three illustrates the operation of the proposed



FIGURE 3. The operation of the proposed scheme.

scheme, whilst table 1 offers the principle notations used and their descriptions.

Table 1. Notations and their descriptions

Notation	Descriptions
E	An elliptic curve
G	An additive group based on E
P	A generator of G
p, q	Large prime numbers
s, Pub	Private and public key pairs
h_1, h_2, h_3	Three secure hash functions
RID_R , RID_v	Real identities of the RSU and vehicle
PID_{v1}, PID_{v2}	Pseudonyms of the vehicle for broadcasting
Ps	Pseudonym of the vehicle to hide its real identity
r	Random integer
PW	Password
$\|\|$	Concatenation operator
$\oplus$	Exclusive OR (XOR) operation
Sk	The signature of the beacon issued from the RSU
m	Traffic-related message
T_{Sk}	The timestamp of the signature
$T, T_r, \triangle T$	Timestamp, receiving time and time delay values

A. INITIALISATION SEGMENT

On this phase, the TA generates the preliminary device parameters the usage of the subsequent steps, and updates the gadget parameters to preserve the safety of the system.

1) The TA selects massive high numbers *p*, *q* and an additive group with order q and generator *P*. An additive group *G* includes all points on the elliptic curve *E* that are defined by way of the equation $y^2 = x^3+ax+b \ mod \ p$, where, $a, b \in F_p$.
2) The TA generates a random quantity $s \in Z^*_q$ as the non-public key, and computes the general public key $Pub = s.P$.

3) The TA selects 3 comfy hash functions $h_1 : G \rightarrow Z^*_q$, $h_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \times G \rightarrow Z^*_q$, $h_3 : \{0, 1\}^* \times Z^*_q$ as a cryptographic hash function.

4) The TA preloads the personal key s for every felony RSU.

5) The TA proclaims the gadget parameters $param = \{q, Pub, P, h_1, h_2, h_3\}$.

B. AUTOMOBILE REGISTRATION PHASE

This segment takes place whilst a brand new car's person is willing to enroll in the VANET, therefore, he/she must register for the TA. The method of this section begins by using submitting a real identity RIDv and a password PW from the person to the TA through a comfortable channel. The TA assessments the validity of the RIDv after which computes the pseudonym playstation $Ps = h3 \ (RIDvks)$. Subsequently, it saves < RIDR, PW, Ps > to the registration list and preloads *Psto* the automobile's TPD.

C. CAR BECOMING A MEMBER OF PHASE

In this phase, the automobile joins the RSU and creates a mutual authentication. To start the OBU, the motive force of a automobile must feedback TPD with *RIDv* and PW to check the validity of the driving force. If legitimate, the OBU starts the becoming a member of process as follows.

1) The OBU generates a random integer $r \in Z^*_q$ and computes $PID_{v1} = r.P$ and $PID_{v2} = Ps \oplus h_1 (r.Pub)$. Then, the OBU sends $\{T_1, PID_v, \sigma OBU\}$ to the RSU, in which, $PIDv = \{PID_{v1}, PID_{v2}\}$ and $\sigma OBU = h_3 (T_1 || P_s)$.
2) After the TA gets the message $\{T_2, RIDR, Ps\}$, it first assessments the validity of timestamp T_2. If legitimate, then the TA tests whether or not $\{Ps, RID_R\}$ suit the saved values. If now not, then the TA rejects the message and sends a {*not verified*} message to RSU. In any other case, it sends a {*verified*} message.
3) After the RSU gets the message {*verified=now not verified*}, it assessments whether or not the content of the message is {*verified*}. If no longer, the RSU drops the message and the vehicle is identified as unlawful. Otherwise, it prepares the signature *Sk* with its expiration time *TSk* for the vehicle, where $Sk = s, h_2 (PID_{v1} || PID_{v2} \ okay \ TSk)$. Finally, the RSU sends $\{T_3, TSk , Sk\_enc, \sigma RSU\}$ to the OBU, in which $\sigma RSU = h_2(Sk \ ok \ T3 \ k \ TSk)$ and $Sk\_enc = Sk \oplus h_1(s,PID_{v1})$.

D. RENEW SIGNATURE SEGMENT

When *TSk* expires, the OBU needs to resume the *Sk*. that is executed as follows:
1) The OBU randomly generates a new integer $r^{new} \in Z^*_q$ and computes a new PID^{new}_v , wherein $PID^{new}_{v1} = r^{new}.P$ and $PID^{new}_{v2} = Ps \oplus h_1(r^{new},Pub)$. The OBU then sends $\{T_1, TSk, PID^{new}_v, PID_v, \sigma_v\}$ to the RSU, in which $\sigma_v = Sk + r, h_2(PID^{new}_{v1} || PID^{new}_{v2} || T_1)$.

2) After the RSU receives the message $\{T1, TSk , PID^{new}_v , PID_v, \sigma_v\}$, it first tests the validity of timestamp T_1. If it's far valid, it checks the expiration time TSk (the OBU has decided by the duration time to request new Sk). If not valid, RSU rejects the message and OBU ought to put into effect the automobile becoming a member of section. In any other case, it checks the validity of the vehicle the usage of the subsequent equation

$$\sigma_v P = h_2 (PID_{v1} || PID_{v2} || TSk). Pub + h_2 (PID^{new}_{v1} || PID^{new}_{v2} || T_1) PID_{v1} \quad (1)$$

If Equation (1) isn't valid, the RSU rejects the message; otherwise, it prepares a new $Sk^{new} = s$, h_2 ($PID^{new}_{v1} \,||\, PID^{new}_{v2} \,||\, TSk$) in which, TSk is the brand new expiration time. Sooner or later, RSU sends {$T2$, TSk, Sk_enc, σRSU } to the OBU, wherein $Sk_{enc} = Sk^{new} \oplus h_1(s.\ PID^{new}_{v1})$ and $\sigma RSU = h_2(Sk_{new} \,||\, T_2 \,||\, TSk)$.

The `renew signature' manner may be carried out with any RSU. This indicates when a car leaves the first RSU and needs to renew the signature; the new RSU does now not want to connect to the TA to make sure the legitimacy of the car, since the previous signature Sk became signed by using the first RSU with the non-public key s.

E. BROADCASTING AND VERIFICATION PHASE

1) BROADCASTING

After the OBU joins the RSU, it starts off evolved broadcasting beacons using Sk as a signature for each beacon, as follows:

- The OBU computes the message signature $\sigma m = Sk + r,\ h_3(m \,||\, T)$.
- The OBU computes $\omega = h_3.(m \,//\, T)\ PID_{v1}$, which is used to mitigate the verification time for the receptor.
- The OBU declares the beacon {T, TSk , PID_v, m, ω, σ_m}.

2) VERIFICATION

After the RSU or one OBU receives the beacon {t, TSk, PID_v, m, ω, σ_m}, it first checks the validity of the timestamps {t, $T\ Sk$}. in that case, it keeps verifying the beacon by means of one of the subsequent:

A: SINGLE VERIFICATION

The recipient (the RSU or OBU) verifies the unmarried beacon using the subsequent equation

$$\sigma_m P = h_2\ (PID_{v1} \,||\, PID_{v2} \,||\, TSk\ )\ Pub + \omega \quad (2)$$

If Equation (2) does not preserve, the recipient rejects the beacon. Otherwise, the signature is valid, the sender is prison and the recipient accepts the beacon.

F. AUTOMOBILE REVOCATION PHASE

This segment could be very critical in a VANET to allow the TA no longer most effective to hint a malicious authenticated vehicle and screen its identification, however also to save you this automobile from taking further part in a VANET. This section is as follows.

1) If a malicious authenticated automobile is broadcasting bogus beacons, the RSU computes its pseudonym in line with PID_v, where $P_s = PID_{v2} + h_1(s, PID_{v1})$.
2) The RSU sends playstation to the TA.

2) The TA exhibits the actual identification of the wrongdoer car, according to Ps within the registration list, after which deletes it from the registration listing and sends an {*acknowledgement message*} to the RSU.

V. SAFETY ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

This section offers a security analysis of our proposed scheme, a good way to demonstrate that our scheme is strongly secured under a random oracle model and to make certain that it meets the security and privateers requirements cited in phase III-B. We also present a contrast of our scheme with current strategies.

A. SAFETY EVIDENCE

Theorem 1: The equations used inside the proposed scheme are accurate.

Evidence of Equation (1): within the `renew signature' segment, the RSU tests the validity of the vehicle in keeping with Equation (1).

$L: H: S: \sigma_v P$
$= (Sk + r.\ h_2\ (PID^{new}_{v1} \,//\, PID^{new}_{v2} \,//\, T1)).P$
$= (s.\ h_2\ (PID_{v1} \,||\, PID_{v2} \,||\, TSk) + r.\ h_2\ (PID^{new}_{v} \,||\, PID^{new}_{v2} \,||\, T_1)).P$
$= (h_2\ (PID_{v1} \,||\, PID_{v2} \,||\, TSk\ .s.P + h_2\ (PID^{new}_{v1} \,||\, PID^{new}_{v2} \,||\, T_1)\ .r.\ P)$
$= (h_2\ (PID_{v1} \,||\, PID_{v2} \,||\, TSk)\ .Pub + h_2\ (PID^{new}_{v1} \,||\, PID^{new}_{v2} \,||\, T_1)\ .PID_{v1})$
$= R: H: S$

thus, it's far verified that Equation (1) is correct. Proof of Equation (2): In unmarried verification, the recipient verifies the beacon the usage of Equation (2).

$L{:}H{:}S{:}\sigma mP$
$= (Sk + r.h_3\ (m \,||\, T\ ))\ .P$
$= (s.h_2\ (PID_{v1} \,||\, PID_{v2} \,||\, TSk\ ) + r.h_3\ (m \,||\, T\ ))\ .P$
$= h_2\ (PID_{v1} \,||\, PID_{v2} \,||\, TSk\ )\ .s.P + h_3\ (m \,||\, T\ ))\ .r.P$
$= h_2\ (PID_{v1} \,||\, PID_{v2} \,||\, TSk\ )\ .Pub + h_3\ (m \,||\, T)).PID_{v1}$
$= h_2\ (PID_{v1} \,||\, PID_{v2} \,||\, TSk\ )\ .Pub + \omega$
$= R: H: S.$

for this reason, Equation (2) is verified as accurate. Proof of Equation (three): In batch verification, the recipient verifies the beacons using Equation (3).

$$
\begin{aligned}
&L.H.S\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n}(x_i\sigma_{m,i})\right).P\\
&=\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n}(x_i(Sk+r.h_3\,(m\parallel T))\right).P\\
&=(\sum_{i=1}^{n}(\,x_i\,(\,s.h_2(PID_{i,v1}\parallel PID_{i,v2}\parallel T_{i,Sk})+r_i.h_3\,(\,m_i\\
&\quad\parallel T_i\,)\,)\,)\,).P\\
&=(\sum_{i=1}^{n}(\,x_ih_2(PID_{i,v1}\parallel PID_{i,v2}\parallel T_{i,Sk}).s.P+x_ih_3\,(\,m_i\\
&\quad\parallel T_i\,).r_i.P\,)\,)\\
&=(\sum_{i=1}^{n}(\,x_ih_2(PID_{i,v1}\parallel PID_{i,v2}\parallel T_{i,Sk}).Pub+x_ih_3\,(\,m_i\\
&\quad\parallel T_i\,).PID_{i,v1}\,)\,)\\
&=\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n}(x_ih_2(PID_{i,v1}\parallel PID_{i,v2}\parallel T_{i,Sk}).Pub+x_i\omega_i)\right)\\
&=\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n}(x_ih_2(PID_{i,v1}\parallel PID_{i,v2}\parallel T_{i,Sk}))\right).Pub+\sum_{i=1}^{n}(x_i\omega_i)\\
&=R.H.S.
\end{aligned}
$$

To analyse the safety proof inside the proposed scheme, we assemble a recreation among a challenger Ch and an adversary advert based on the network model of a VANET and an adversary.

B. PROTECTION EVALUATION

1) MESSAGE INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICATION

Regular with Theorem 2, the ECDLP is difficult. Thus, the adversary can't forge a valid beacon in our proposed scheme, and recipients can observe the integrity and validity of the beacon $\{T, TSk, PID_v, m, \omega, \sigma_m\}$ by way of checking whether the equation $\sigma_m P = h_2 (PID_{v1} \,//\, PID_{v2} \,//\, TSk\,)\, Pub + \omega$ holds. Consequently, our proposed scheme satisfies the message integrity and authentication requirement.

2) PRIVACY PRESERVATION

In our scheme, the car also renews the signature and updates PID_v after the TSk expires, which means that once a short time, an adversary receives a beacon message containing a specific PID_v and signed with a brand new Sk. it's far consequently very difcult for an adversary to generate a correlation among the quick-changing pseudonyms for the automobile, and the adversary can't accumulate the region of the vehicle. For that reason, our proposed scheme satisfies the requirement for privacy protection.

3) TRACEABILITY AND REVOCATION

In the proposed scheme, despite the fact that a beacon does no longer include any facts approximately RIDv, the TA can trace and revoke the factitious car, as noted in phase IV-F. Hence, our proposed scheme satisfies the traceability and revocation necessities.

4) NON-REPUDIATION

In our scheme, once the TA has traced the RIDv of a beacon dispatched to the VANET, the beacon sender will now not be able to deny he/she dispatched this beacon since the OBUs broadcast varied beacons based totally on their personal unique ps. similarly, within the system of batch verification of beacons, we use a random integer vector x = $\{x_1, x_2 \ldots, x_n\}$ to examination any exchanges of the beacons. As a result, our proposed scheme satisfies the non-repudiation requirement.

5) CONDITIONAL ANONYMITY

The actual identity of the perpetrator vehicle in our scheme is traced and revoked from the VANET when malicious pastime is detected, as noted in segment IV-F. However, the anonymity of honest vehicles is assured in the scheme. For that reason, our proposed scheme satisfies the conditional anonymity requirement.

6) RESISTANCE TO IMPERSONATION ASSAULT

inside the case wherein an attacker attempts to impersonate the vehicle within the becoming a member of section: inside the proposed scheme, the joining message $\{T_1, PID_v, \sigma OBU\}$ that is dispatched by way of the car to the RSU consists of OBU D h3(T1 k playstation). Therefore, an attacker cannot impersonate any automobile due to the fact he/she does now not have the vehicle's pseudonym playstation.

7) RESISTANCE TO A REPLAY ATTACK

In the beacon message $\{T, TSk, PID_v, m, \omega, \sigma_m\}$, we use the modern timestamp T . An attacker can't modify T in a beacon considering that inside the verification technique, the beacon might be rejected if T changed into invalid or had expired. Thus, the replay assault is useless inside the proposed scheme.

C. COMPARISION WITH EXISTING SCHEMES

This subsection affords a comparison of our scheme with earlier processes concerning issues found in companies [13][14], [21]-[24], and [26]. The proposed scheme does now not rely on a bilinear pairing operation and satisfies the requirements for revocation and privateers. It additionally does now not depend on the RSU to verify beacons. Desk 2 provides the consequences of contrast.

TABLE 2. Comparison with existing schemes

Feature	[13-20]	[21-26]	[27-28]	Our scheme
Uses a bilinear pairing operation	Yes	No	No	No
Does not meet the revocation requirement and an insider attack can obtain RID	Yes	Yes	No	No
Beacons verified by the RSU	No	No	Yes	No

VI. OVERALL PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

This phase explains the computation and communiqué prices.

A.COMPUTATION value on this subsection, we exhibit the performance of our scheme by means of comparing it with the ones of Jianhong et al. [20], Debiao et al. [22], Libing et al. [25], and Jie et al. [26] in terms of computation cost. The cryptography operation in [20] is constructed on bilinear pairings, at the same time as those of [22], [25], [26] and our scheme use ECC. In a bilinear pairing with an 80-bit safety level, the additive institution GN is generated based on an elliptic curve EN Vy2 D x3 C x mod pN , where Np is a 512-bit prime number. But, in ECC with the same protection level, the additive group G is generated based totally on an elliptic curve E V y2 D x3 C ax C b mod p, in which p is a one hundred sixty-bit top wide variety.

TABLE 3. Execution time and descriptions of cryptographic operations [22]

Abbr.	Execution time (ms)	Description
T_{bp}	4.211	Bilinear pairing operation
T_{sm-bp}	1.709	Scalar multiplication operation in a group based on bilinear pairing
$T_{sm-bp-s}$	0.0535	Small scalar point multiplication operation in a group based on bilinear pairing
T_{pa-bp}	0.0071	Point addition operation in a group based on bilinear pairing
T_{mtp}	4.406	Map-to-point hash function
T_{sm-ecc}	0.442	Scalar multiplication operation in a group based on ECC
$T_{sm-ecc-s}$	0.0138	Small scalar point multiplication operation in a group based on ECC
T_{pa-ecc}	0.0018	Point addition operation in a group based on ECC
T_h	0.0001	General hash function operation

For simplicity, allow BGS, SVOB and BVMB denote the technology and signing of the beacon, the unmarried verification for a beacon, and the batch verification for more than one beacons, respectively. Within the scheme of Jianhong et al. [20], BGS accommodates the subsequent operations: six scalar multiplications; two factor additions; one map-to-factor hash feature; and four secure hash features.

Table five shows the development of our proposed scheme over the alternative schemes in terms of computation price. Fig. 4 demonstrates that our scheme has a massive benefit over the opposite four schemes with recognize to BGS and SVOB. Fig. five suggests the computation prices for BVMB for extraordinary numbers of beacons. Therefore, the proposed scheme is extra efficient and powerful than the ones of Jianhong et al. [20], Debiao et al. [22], Libing et al. [25], and Jie et al. [26] in phrases of the computation fee for BGS, SVOB and BVMB.

TABLE 5. Improvement of our proposed scheme over other schemes in terms of computation cost.

Scheme	*BGS*	*SVOB*	*BVMB* (50 beacon)
Jianhong et al. [20]	96.9%	94.5%	97.8%
Debiao et al. [22]	66.7%	33.4%	90.3%
Libing et al. [25]	49.9%	50%	94.9%
Jie et al. [27]	49.9%	33.3%	90.2%



FIGURE 4. The computation costs of PGS and SVOB.



FIGURE 5. The computation costs of BVMB for the different number of beacons.

VII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have proposed a new scheme called EAAP for secure vehicular communication in VANETs. In the proposed EAAP scheme, an RSU can effectively authenticate vehicles in an anonymous manner before providing LBSI messages to vehicles. Similarly, vehicles can also authenticate an RSU in an anonymous manner before receiving LBSI messages from RSUs. EAAP scheme not only provides the anonymous authentication with low certificate and signature verification costs which are essentially required in the VANET applications, but also able to

provide an efficient conditional privacy tracking mechanism to reveal the real identity of the malicious vehicle for enhancing the efficiency of the VANET system. The proposed EAAP scheme also provides better efficiency in terms of fast verification on certificates and signatures than the previously reported schemes BLS, ECPP, CAS, GSB and KPSD. Our future extension of this work is to provide batch authentication with low computational cost in an efficient way.

VIII. REFERENCES

[1] X. Lin, X. Sun, P.-H. Ho, and X. Shen, "GSIS: a secure and privacy-preserving protocol for vehicular communications," *IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology*, vol. 56, no. 6, pp. 3442–3456, 2007.

[2] C. Zhang, R. Lu, X. Lin, P.-H. Ho, and X. Shen, "An efficient identity-based batch verification scheme for vehicular sensor networks," in *Proceedings of the 27th IEEE Communications Society Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM '08)*, pp. 246–250, IEEE, Phoenix, Ariz, USA, April 2008.

[3] Y. Jiang, M. Shi, X. Shen, and C. Lin, "BAT: a robust signature scheme for vehicular networks using binary authentication tree," *IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications*, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 1974–1983, 2009.

[4] J. Sun, C. Zhang, Y. Zhang, and Y. Fang, "An identity-based security system for user privacy in vehicular ad hoc networks," *IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems*, vol. 21, no. 9, pp. 1227–1239, 2010.

[5] J.-L. Huang, L.-Y. Yeh, and H.-Y. Chien, "ABAKA: an anonymous batch authenticated and key agreement scheme for value-added services in vehicular ad hoc networks," *IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology*, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 248–262, 2011.

[6] D. He, S. Zeadally, B. Xu, and X. Huang, "An efficient identity-based conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme for vehicular ad hoc networks," *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security*, vol. 10, no. 12, pp. 2681–2691, 2015.

[7] J. Li, H. Lu, and M. Guizani, "ACPN: A novel authentication framework with conditional privacy-preservation and non-repudiation for VANETs," *IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems*, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 938–948, 2015.

[8] F. Wang, Y. Xu, H. Zhang, Y. Zhang, and L. Zhu, "2FLIP: A two-factor lightweight privacy-preserving authentication scheme for VANET," *IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology*, vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 896–911, 2016.

[9] M. Raya and J.-P. Hubaux, "Securing vehicular ad hoc networks," *Journal of Computer Security*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 39–68, 2007.

[10] J. Quisquater and D. Samyde, "Electromagnetic analysis (ema): Measures and counter-measures for smart cards," in *Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards*, pp. 200–210, Springer, Berlin, Germany, 2001.

[11] P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun, "Differential power analysis," in *Proceedings of the Annual International Cryptology Conference*, vol. 1666 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pp. 388–397, Springer, Berlin, Germany, 1999.

[12] C. Zhang, X. Lin, R. Lu, P.-H. Ho, and X. Shen, "An efficient message authentication scheme for vehicular communications," *IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology*, vol. 57, no. 6, pp. 3357–3368, 2008.

[13] L. Zhang, Q. Wu, J. Domingo-Ferrer, B. Qin, and C. Hu, "Distributed aggregate privacy-preserving authentication in VANETs," *IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems*, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 516–526, 2016.

[14] S.-J. Horng, S.-F. Tzeng, Y. Pan et al., "B-SPECS+: batch verification for secure pseudonymous authentication in VANET," *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security*, vol. 8, no. 11, pp. 1860–1875, 2013.

[15] R. Lu, X. Lin, H. Zhu, P.-H. Ho, and X. Shen, "ECPP: efficient conditional privacy preservation protocol for secure vehicular communications," in *Proceedings of the 27th IEEE Communications Society Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM '08)*, pp. 1229–1237, IEEE, April 2008.

[16] C. Lyu, D. Gu, Y. Zeng, and P. Mohapatra, "PBA: prediction-based authentication for vehicle-to-vehicle communications," *IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing*, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 71–83, 2016.

[17] J. Shen, T. Zhou, F. Wei, X. Sun, and Y. Xiang, "Privacy-preserving and lightweight key agreement protocol for v2g in the social internet of things," *IEEE*

Internet of Things Journal, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 2526–2536, 2018.

[18] A. Perrig, R. Canetti, D. J. Tygar et al., "The TESLA broadcast authentication protocol," *Rsa Cryptobytes*, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 2–13, 2002.

[19] A. Studer, E. Shi, F. Bai, and A. Perrig, "TACKing together efficient authentication, revocation, and privacy in VANETs," in *Proceedings of the 6th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, SECON 2009*, pp. 1–9, IEEE, Italy, June 2009.

[20] Azimi, R., Bhatia, G., Rajkumar, R. et al.: 'Vehicular networks for collision avoidance at intersections',. Proc. SAE World Congr.., Detroit, USA, Apr. 2011, pp. 406–416

[21] Tangade, S.S, Manvi, S.S.: 'A survey on attacks, security and trust management solutions in VANETs' , Proc. ICCCNT13, Tiruchengode, July India, 2013, pp. 1-6

[22] AI-Sultan, S., AI-Doori, M.M., AI-Bayatti, A.H., et al.: 'A comprehensive survey on vehicular ad hoc network', Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 2014, 37, (2014), pp. 380-392

[23] Fengzhong, Q., Zhihui, W., Fei-Yue, W., et al.: 'A security and privacy review of VANETs', IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst., 2015, 16, (6), pp. 2958–2996

[24] Xiaodong, L., Xiaoting, S., Ping-Han, H., et al.: 'GSIS: A secure and privacy preserving protocol for vehicular communications'. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., 2007, 56, (6), pp. 3442–3456

[25] Chenxi, Z., Xiaodong, L., Rongxing, L., et al.: 'An efficient message authentication scheme for vehicular communications', IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., 2008, 57, (6), pp. 3357–3368

[26] Lei, Z., Qianhong ,W., Agusti, S., et al.: 'A scalable robust authentication protocol for secure vehicular communications'. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., 2010, 59, (4), pp. 1606–1617

Authors Profile

N Saikiran, M.Tech., working as an Asst. Professor in CSE Department in QIS College of Engineering and Technology (Autonomous), Ongole, Andhra Pradesh, India.

K Sandeep pursuing B Tech in computer science engineering from Qis college of Engineering and Technology (Autonomous & NAAC 'A' Grade), Ponduru Road, Vengamukkalapalem, Ongole, Prakasam Dist, Affiliated to Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Kakinada.

M KotiReddy pursuing B Tech in computer science engineering from Qis college of Engineering and Technology (Autonomous & NAAC 'A' Grade), Ponduru Road, Vengamukkalapalem, Ongole, Prakasam Dist, Affiliated to Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Kakinada.

G Anil Kumar pursuing B Tech in computer science engineering from Qis college of Engineering and Technology (Autonomous & NAAC 'A' Grade), Ponduru Road, Vengamukkalapalem, Ongole, Prakasam Dist, Affiliated to Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Kakinada.

M Mohammad Assiff pursuing B Tech in computer science engineering from Qis college of Engineering and Technology (Autonomous & NAAC 'A' Grade), Ponduru Road, Vengamukkalapalem, Ongole, Prakasam Dist, Affiliated to Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Kakinada.